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Abstract. This paper studies politicians who have a present-bias for spending:
they want to increase current spending and procrastinate spending cuts. We argue that
legislators' bias is more severe in economies with low institutional quality. We show
that disagreement in legislatures leads to policy persistence and that this attenuates the
temptation to overspend. Depending on the environment, legislators' decisions to be
scally responsible may either complement or substitute other legislator's decisions. In
economies with weak institutions, politicians' actions are strategic complements. Thus,
institutional changes that induce scal responsibility are desirable, they generate a pos-
itive responsibility multiplier and reduce inecient spending. However, in economies
with better institutions, the same institutional change would induce some legislators to
free ride on others' responsibility and may lead to more inecient spending.
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1. Introduction
The recent literature in public economics emphasizes that politicians may have preferences
that are not perfectly aligned with those of their constituents, leading to inecient outcomes.
In particular, politicians may have incentives to shift spending toward the current period
rather than taking a comprehensive intertemporal view. Political and economic institutions
are key to dealing with this problem.1
A common belief is that disagreement among politicians is harmful since it delays policy
changes. In this paper we show that disagreement is a key feature of the political process
that provides an incentive to control legislators' temptation to overspend. For this reason,
heterogeneity among politicians, which is necessary for disagreement, helps to reduce ine-
ciencies. Therefore, institutional changes that increase disagreement are generally benecial
while those changes that reduce it are detrimental.
We study politicians who are partially benevolent. They care about society's welfare but
also derive utility from government spending. We show that this generates a present bias for
spending. Legislators want high current spending and low spending in the future. Yet, when
the future comes politicians have the incentive to be scally irresponsible; They are tempted
to keep spending high and postpone spending cuts. We consider a model with a continuum
of such politicians who dier with respect to the strength of their spending bias. Some gain
more than others when spending increases. However, they all agree in one dimension: if there
were a commitment technology, all legislators would agree on lower spending for the future.
Self-control problems have been analyzed in the literature mainly with models with a sin-
gle decision-maker.2 When the focus is on public policy decisions, the single decision-maker
framework is less appealing. In this paper, spending decisions are negotiated by legislators.
The model incorporates three wide spread institutional features. First, in each period spend-
ing is decided through legislative bargaining between a randomly recognized agenda setter
(the executive) and the legislature: there is separation of power. Second, approval of pro-
posals is probabilistic; when an executive makes a proposal, there is uncertainty about its
acceptance. Finally, the status quo is the default option in case of disagreement. Legislators
know that the implemented policy will become the default option for the next legislative
1This view is at the core of the eld of public choice (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Besley (2006) cover the recent contributions of the political economy literature.
2See Akerlof (1991), Laibson (1997), and O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999), among others.Spending-Biased Legislators 2
session. This feature introduces a dynamic linkage across periods.
Our rst contribution is to provide a precise characterization of how legislative bargaining
enhances eciency. We nd that the endogeneity of the status quo and separation of power
play important roles reducing inecient spending. We argue that when policies are chosen by
a single decision-maker, the only equilibrium is one in which high spending is always chosen.
When there is legislative bargaining, however, there are equilibria with no inecient spending
along the equilibrium path.
To understand this result, it is important to appreciate the role of the status quo. Sep-
aration of powers between the executive and the legislature leads (with some endogenous
probability) to policy persistence. The status quo is maintained when the powers do not
agree on a policy change. Forward looking legislators realize that current decisions may per-
sist due to the possibility of political deadlock, which in turn provides legislators with the
incentive to keep inecient spending low. The expectation of future disagreement is the
key to discipline current legislators. If all legislators are expected to favor the same policy,
there is no status-quo bias and, hence, no incentive to forgo the temptation to spend. Thus,
heterogeneity and disagreement in the legislature are necessary to sustain equilibria with low
levels of inecient spending.
The dynamic linkage created by the status quo leads to non-trivial interactions between
current and future legislators. We emphasize that such interactions would not arise if policy
persistence were exogenously assumed. The current level of legislator's scal responsibility
depends on the expected responsibility of future ones. The two can either complement or sub-
stitute each other depending on a key parameter: the average degree of self-control problems
in the legislature. This parameter can be thought as an indicator of the quality of institutions
in the economy since strong political institutions place more constraints on politicians and
thus reduce their temptation to raise current spending.
The second contribution is a clear understanding of the strategic interactions at play. They
determine the direction and size of institutional changes' impact. We nd that strategic sub-
stitutability is at work in economies where politicians have a relatively moderate temptation
to spend (e.g., in economies with strong institutions). This implies that institutional changes
that induce some legislators to be scally responsible would trigger irresponsibility in other
legislators. To understand why, note that in economies with relatively strong institutions theSpending-Biased Legislators 3
majority of legislators are in favor of low spending. A further increase in scal reasonability
would reinforce the majority view and thus reduce disagreement in the legislature, leading to
weaker incentives to be scally responsible. Intuitively, politicians are tempted to free-ride
and indulge themselves with current spending if they expect most future politicians to be re-
sponsible. Substitutability is the reason why in economies which are already characterized by
relatively strong institutions, a further improvement of institutional quality reduces spending
only by a small amount.
Conversely, strategic complementarity is at work in economies where on average politicians
have severe self-control problems (e.g., in economies with weak institutions.) This explains
why such economies may nd themselves trapped in an equilibrium with high spending.
To improve outcomes, it would be desirable to adopt institutions that reduce politicians'
temptation to increase spending. Due to strategic complementarity, such changes could
trigger even more responsibility in other legislators and generate a virtuous cycle leading to
substantial cuts in inecient spending. The reason for this responsibility multiplier is that
in economies with weak institutions the majority of legislators support high spending. An
increase of scal responsibility would then lead to a legislature more evenly divided between
scally responsible and irresponsible. This raises the probability of political deadlock and
thus strengthens the incentive to keep spending low.
Since economies with weak and strong institutions are not characterized by the same
type of strategic interactions, similar institutional changes can have very dierent eects in
economies with dierent institutional quality. To demonstrate this result, we analyze the
consequence of a specic institutional change: an increase in the number of legislators who
have a strong temptation to spend. Such a change might, for example, follows an extension of
voting rights to allow poorer and more pro-spending constituencies to vote. First, increasing
the number of legislators with severe self-control problems has a direct eect: taking as
given equilibrium strategies, this change makes it more likely that spending increases are
accepted and spending cuts rejected, which tends to increase spending. On other other
hand, there is an eect on equilibrium strategies, whose sign is ambiguous and depends on
the environment. In economies where the average spending bias is low, adding more scally
irresponsible legislators has a disciplinary eect. Politicians realize that in the new legislature
high spending will persist with higher probability, which changes equilibrium behavior and
induces some legislators who were scally irresponsible to become responsible. Since the twoSpending-Biased Legislators 4
eects go in opposite directions, the overall eect is ambiguous. Surprisingly, after adding a
signicant number of pro-spending legislators, expected spending could actually decrease. In
Section 4 we argue that this may help explain why elites decided to grant voting rights to
poor citizens (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, and Lizzeri and Persico, 2004, for dierent
explanations). Conversely, in economies where the average spending bias is severe, having
more scally irresponsible legislators discourages even more legislators from choosing low
spending. In such economies, both eects go in the same direction: spending unambiguously
increases as a result.
A general lesson that we can draw from these results is that there are no institutions
that work well in all environments. Institutions that increase inecient spending in some
economies, may reduce it in others. We reach similar conclusions in Section 5, where we
consider other institutional changes.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3
presents our basic model with probabilistic acceptance and maximum executive turnover. In
Section 4, we study the consequences of a distributional shift. Section 5 analyzes the role
of executive turnover and modies the rules necessary to pass a proposal. We conclude in
Section 6.
2. Literature Review
This paper is related to a large literature that argues that separation of power is desirable since
it prevents politicians from abusing their powers. Persson et al. (1997, 2000) study dierent
noncooperative legislative bargaining games and formally demonstrate that separation of
powers between the executive and legislative branches of government limits the scope of
collusion among politicians at the voters' expense. Battaglini and Coate (2007, 2008) built
dynamic models of legislative bargaining to analyze how policies respond to shocks in public
spending needs and to characterize how public debt evolves over time. Battaglini et al.
(2012) study dynamic provision of public good. Recently, Robinson and Torvik (2013) have
argued that a shock that generates new economic opportunities (e.g., a discovery of natural
resources) will raise output in economies where politicians face stronger constraints, but will
decrease it in economies with weak institutions. Their conclusion is similar to ours in that
institutional quality determines the comparative statics of the equilibrium.
As in this model, various papers have analyzed legislative bargaining with an endogenousSpending-Biased Legislators 5
default option for the bargaining process. Starting from the seminal contribution of Baron
(1996), this literature has been rapidly growing.3 All papers focus on standard time consistent
preferences and consider bargaining protocols where the outcome of the bargaining process
is deterministic. So, from this point of view our paper contributes methodologically to the
dynamic bargaining literature. A common result of the endogenous status quo literature is
that when legislators have concave preferences having an endogenous status quo improves
welfare by reducing policy variability. In this paper, decision makers have linear utility and
the endogenous status quo is benecial because it serves a disciplinary role. Riboni (2010)
and Piguillem and Riboni (2012) also argue that the endogenous status quo has a disciplinary
role in the context of a Barro-Gordon economy and in a capital taxation model, respectively.
Compared to them, we provide a tractable model with closed form solutions. This allows us
a clear understanding of how public policies vary as we change the political and institutional
environment.
The large literature on self-control problems has shown that time-inconsistent preferences,
as in Phelps and Pollak, (1968) and Laibson (1997) may lead to procrastination and prepr-
operation (doing things too early).4 There are now a few papers which introduce self-control
problems in political economy. In Bisin et al. (2011) and Lizzeri and Yariv (2012), voters are
time inconsistent. In their model politicians may exploit voters' behavioral biases in order to
win the election. They compare the outcome under government intervention with the laissez
faire equilibrium, where consumption and savings decisions are decentralized.
Halac and Yared (2012) study the optimal debt policy of a benevolent government with
self-control problems, i.e. a government which is present-biased towards public spending.
The optimal scal rule solves the trade-o between the value of commitment and the need
to respond to spending shocks. Interestingly, the economic mechanism behind their opti-
mal contract is similar to ours. If a government claims to have high spending needs, it is
\punished" by relaxing the borrowing limit of future governments. That is, today's scal
irresponsibility is punished with potentially more irresponsibility in the future. This suggests
3Recent contributions include Kalandrakis (2004), Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2008), Diermeier and Fong
(2010), Duggan and Kalandrakis (2011), Zapal (2011), Nunnari (2012), Dziuda and Loeper (2012), Bowen
and Zahran (2012), Bowen et al. (2012), Anesi and Seidmann (2013), and Baron and Bowen (2013).
4See O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). Laibson et al. (2007) show that hyperbolic discounting may cause
insucient savings for retirement. Krusell and Smith (2003) study a consumption-saving decisions and nd
indeterminacy of Markov equilibrium savings rules.Spending-Biased Legislators 6
that the main mechanism highlighted in our paper as welfare enhancing may extend to other
settings.
Finally, this paper is also related to a large strand of literature analyzing political turnover.
A common insight of this literature is that when the government is uncertain about its
survival, it may engage in short-termism and choose suboptimal policies in order to \worsen"
the state of the world inherited by its successor (see for instance, Alesina and Tabellini, 1990,
Persson and Svensson, 1989, and Azzimonti, 2011).5 While we assume separation of power,
notice that these papers assume that the executive is a policy dictator. Second, in our model
legislators discount future public policies in the same way when they have agenda setting
power and when they don't. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Azzimonti (2011) assume
instead that public goods chosen by the opponent are less valuable. Alesina et al (1996)
argue that political instability and political uncertainty is detrimental to welfare because
it discourages private investment and lowers productivity. We stress that all these papers
treat turnover as exogenous.6 Some papers have questioned the view that long-lived political
regimes are welfare improving. For instance, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) emphasize the
possibility that such regimes may block benecial technological or institutional changes in
order to maintain their power.7
3. The Model
Time is innite and indexed by t. Let t and st denote, respectively, the income tax rate and
the spending level in period t. Where st 2 fs;sg; with 0  s < s:8
For simplicity, we assume that the government's budget is balanced: t = st. This implies
that there is a simple mapping between taxation and spending: low s translates into low
taxes, while high s translates into high taxes. We abstract from debt in order to isolate the
5The literature has also emphasized that political turnover leads to higher probability of sovereign default
(see Amador, 2003, and Cuadra and Sapriza, 2008), higher seignorage (Cukierman et al, 1992) and smaller
scal and legal capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009). Dal B o and Rossi (2012) empirically analyze the eects
of term length on legislative productivity.
6Turnover is treated as endogenous in the political agency models. See the seminal papers by Barro (1973)
and Ferejohn (1986). Recent contributions include Acemoglu et al. (2008), Yared (2010), and Ales et al.
(2012).
7The agency model by Acemoglu et al. (2011) also obtains that political turnover is desirable.
8The assumption that the policy space includes only two alternatives is without loss of generality. Results
would not change if the policy space were the interval [s;s]. This is because equilibrium indirect utilities will
be linear in the current policy. As a result, policymakers' choices will be at the corners.Spending-Biased Legislators 7
direct eect of the endogenous status quo. Our model could be interpreted as the problem
faced by legislators in several US states, where balanced budget requirements force them to
nance current spending with tax revenue.9
3.1. Preferences
Throughout this paper, legislators have dynamically inconsistent preferences about spending.
In words, if it were possible to commit to a sequence of spending, politicians would choose
high spending in the current period (nanced by high taxes) and relatively lower spending in
the following periods (nanced by low taxes). In the absence of commitment, however, they
are tempted to ex-post renege on their promises, keep spending high and postpone spending
cuts to future periods.
More formally, assume that there is a continuum of legislators, each indexed by the pa-
rameter ai, where ai 2 [0;1]. Life-time utility of legislator ai at time t is
Ui;t = aist  
P1
j=1 
jst+j; (1)
where  2 (0;1]. It is immediate that the innite sequence of spending that maximizes (1) is
equal to (s;s;s;s;:::).
At time t + 1 life-time utility becomes:
Ui;t+1 = aist+1  
P1
j=1 
jst+1+j: (2)
Note that the coecient that multiplies st+1 is equal to   when utility is evaluated at time
t, but becomes ai in expression (2), when utility is evaluated at time t+1. This implies that
in the absence of commitment, policy-makers would have an incentive to revise the spending
plan chosen at t and select s at time t + 1. The higher ai, the higher the marginal benet of
deviating ex-post by selecting s. In a way, ai measures the severity of the time consistency
problem of legislator i.
The parameter  will be important in our analysis. Economies where legislators have a
smaller  are countries where legislators are less forward looking. All things being equal,
9Adding debt would introduce an additional linkage across periods. See Persson and Svennson (1989),
Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Battaglini and Coate (2008) for interesting implications.Spending-Biased Legislators 8
this implies that on average legislators have a stronger spending-bias. As discussed in the
next section,  also measures the politicians' degree of benevolence towards consumers. Up
to some approximation we can interpret  more broadly as related to indicators of the rule
of law, corruption and quality of institutions. In economies where such indicators are low,
politicians can more easily appropriate part of the tax revenue. Consequently, we expect that
on average politicians will be more tempted to raise spending.
Politicians' preferences, as described in (1) and (2), constitute a tractable way to model
self-control problems in legislatures.10 In the next subsection, we provide a setting that
rationalizes such preferences.11
3.1.1. A rationalization of the preferences. Consider an economy populated by a con-
tinuum of consumers and by a continuum of politicians, both of measure 1. Consumers'
income is exogenous and equal to 1 at all t.
We let Uc;t denote the consumers' intertemporal utility at time t:
Uc;t =
P1
j=0 Fc(j)(1   st+j) (3)
where 0  Fc(j)  1 is the consumers' discount function, with Fc(0) = 1 and Fc decreasing
in j. Note from (3) that for consumers public spending is assumed to be wasteful.
We suppose instead that politicians derive positive utility from spending.12 This may
occur because they capture part of the spending revenue or because they are able to use it for
pet projects. Although to dierent degrees, politicians also care about consumers' well-being.
The idiosyncratic parameter i 2 [1;], measures politicians' benevolence: the higher i, the
lower the benevolence. We assume that politicians' intertemporal preferences at time t can
be represented by the following utility function:
U
0
i;t = Uc;t + i
P1
j=0 Fl(j)st+j (4)
where 0  Fl(j)  1 is the discount function used to evaluate future spending. The second
term of (4) is the utility that politicians derive from current and future spending. They face
10Similar preferences have been assumed by Halac and Yared (2012).
11Uninterested readers may skip Section 3.1.1 and move to the discussion of the bargaining protocol.
12The assumption that all consumers (politicians) dislike (like) spending is made for tractability. It would
be enough to assume that politicians like spending more than consumers.Spending-Biased Legislators 9
a simple trade-o: increasing spending raises the second term of (4), but reduces consumers
welfare.
We assume that
Fl(j) < Fc(j) (5)
for j > 1. That is, legislators are suciently more impatient than consumers. A possible
reason for this is that politicians internalize the possibility of exiting the legislature.
After substituting (3) into (4) it is immediate to see that politicians' utility is linear in
spending. Therefore, in order to nd the spending sequence that maximizes (4), we need to
determine the sign of the coecients multiplying st+j, for all j  0. Since i is assumed
to be higher than 1, the coecient attached to st is positive. Inequality (5) implies that
the coecient attached to future spending is negative. As a result, politicians would nd
it optimal to choose high spending in the current period, but low spending from tomorrow
onwards. We obtain this result because consumers' welfare matters relatively more when
choosing future spending, while the second term of (4) matters relatively more when choosing
current spending.
After recalculating the utility at time t + 1, note that if legislators had the possibility to
re-optimize in the future, they would renege on their promises and choose high spending also
at t + 1.13
We now show that for specic values of Fl(j) and Fc(j) we obtain the reduced-form utility
(1). Choose Fl(j) = 
j and Fc(j) = 
j. When 0   < 1=2 and  = 2, inequality (5) holds.
If we divide (4) by the positive term (1   i), (4) can be rewritten as (1), where
ai 
(i   1)
(1   i)
 0: (6)
After evaluating (4) at t + 1 and performing similar transformations, we obtain (2).
13It is interesting to note that such self-control problem arises even if Fl(j) and Fc(j) coincide with standard
exponential discount functions. Along similar lines, Jackson and Yariv (2012) show that with heterogeneity
in discounting, utilitarian aggregation generically results in time-inconsistent preferences.Spending-Biased Legislators 10
3.2. Legislative Bargaining
Spending is decided sequentially by politicians through legislative bargaining. There is a
continuum of legislators, each indexed by the parameter ai, with preferences represented by
(1) and (2). For tractability, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. In the legislature, the distribution of ai is uniform on [0;1]
At each t, legislative bargaining unfolds as follows:
(i) The agenda setter (or executive) at time t is chosen. With probability 
she coincides with the agenda setter at t 1, with probability 1  a new agenda
setter is drawn from the legislature.
(ii) The executive currently in power makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to
the oor. Subsequently, all legislators simultaneously cast a vote (either \accept"
or \reject").
(iii) Proposals pass with probability equal to the measure of legislators who
accept it.
(iv) If the proposal is rejected, the status quo policy qt is implemented. If the
proposal is accepted, it becomes the spending for the current period. Moreover it
becomes the default option for next period: qt+1 = st.
Point (i) species that in each period one legislator has the right to propose the spending
level for the current period. In this paper, such legislator is denoted as agenda setter or
executive.14 Executives are drawn from the legislature. When Assumption 1 holds this
implies that the new executive is drawn from a Uniform distribution on [0,1].
The parameter  measures the durability of the executive. To grasp the main intuition of
the economic mechanism involved we temporarily assume maximum turnover.
Assumption 2. No incumbency advantage:  = 0.
14In practice, legislatures often cede agenda-setting powers to executive oces, such as, the president or
premier. This is why in this paper we use the words agenda setter and chief executive interchangeably.Spending-Biased Legislators 11
Given that we have a continuum of legislators, when  = 0 the current executive is
replaced with probability one in the following period. Later in Section 5.1, we solve the case
of  = 1: the executive chosen at t = 0 is never replaced.
Point (iii) above states that the probability of acceptance increases linearly in the number
of legislators who favor the proposal. More specically, if we denote by x 2 [0;1] the measure
of legislators who favor the proposal, the proposal is assumed to pass with probability x. The
proposal is accepted for sure only when all legislators prefer the proposal to the status quo, and
it is rejected for sure when all legislators prefer the status quo. An implication of (iii) is that a
rejection may occur even if the majority of legislators are in favor of it. In a typical legislature,
this may happen when a minority of legislators have the ability to delay or veto the approval
of the bill. On the other hand, (iii) also implies that a proposal may pass (although with
smaller probability) when it is approved by a minority. We believe that in practice this might
be the result of vote trading across issues or party discipline.15 Probabilistic acceptance makes
our setting analytically tractable. At the same time, it captures the inherent uncertainty in
the actual legislative bargaining process. We emphasize that the thrust of our analysis would
not change under simple majority rule: on this, see Section 5.3.
Finally, point (iv) states that the status quo, which coincides with the previous period's
spending level, is the default option in case of disagreement. As argued by Tsebelis (2002, p.
8), this is a realistic institutional feature in actual budget negotiations.16
3.3. Markov-Perfect Equilibrium
We now compute the pure-strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of the dynamic game
among successive legislators. The status quo is the only payo-relevant state variable. Since
strategies are stationary, we remove the time index from the notation. A MPE of the game
is (i) a proposal rule specifying the proposal made by an agenda setter of type ai for all
status quo policies and (ii) a voting rule specifying the vote of legislator ai after any proposal
15To see this, suppose that the policy stance of the majority party is decided by the median legislator
within the party. Under party discipline, a policy change may then pass with the support of only 25 percent
of the legislature.
16For instance, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union states: \Where no Council regulation
determining a new nancial framework has been adopted by the end of the previous nancial framework, the
ceilings and other provisions corresponding to the last year of that framework shall be extended until such
time as that act is adopted." (Para 4, Art 312, European Union 2010).Spending-Biased Legislators 12
and starting from all status quo policies. Each legislator at any point in time is modeled
as a \separate" agent who chooses her strategy in order to maximize her utility given the
strategies of all other players (including her future selves). All politicians have sophisticated
forecast of their own future time-inconsistent behavior. Moreover, legislators internalize that
the current policy becomes the status quo in the next legislative session.
Voting strategy. As standard in the literature we assume that a legislator says \yes" to
proposal s if she weakly prefers it over the default alternative in case of rejection. More
formally, a legislator of type ai votes in favor of the proposal if and only if
ais + EV (s)  aiq + EV (q): (7)
The left-hand side of (7) is the utility of implementing the proposal plus the expected con-
tinuation utility of going to the next period with s as new status quo. The right-hand side is
the utility of maintaining the status quo policy q plus the continuation utility of going to the
next period with the status quo. By (7) it is immediate that q is accepted by all legislators,
if it is proposed.
Proposal strategy. The recognized agenda setter chooses the proposal that maximizes her
intertemporal payo given the strategies of all players. Since the policy space includes only
two alternatives, one of the two alternatives necessarily coincides with the status quo. Then,
the agenda setter's problem amounts to a simple comparison between the utility of proposing
a policy change and the utility of proposing no change.
An agenda setter ai prefers proposing s rather than keeping the status quo when
[1   Prob(s passes)] [aiq + EV (q)]+ Prob(s passes) [ais + EV (s)]  aiq + EV (q) (8)
The left-hand side of (8) is the uncertain payo of proposing a policy change; the right-hand
side is the utility of proposing the status quo, which is accepted by all legislators and thus
passes for sure. Inequality (8) is satised if
ais + EV (s)  aiq + EV (q) (9)
Note that condition (7) coincides with condition (9). Thus, the considerations aecting votingSpending-Biased Legislators 13
and proposal decisions are identical. This greatly simplies our analysis.
Equilibrium Characterization. In any MPE legislators follow cuto strategies.17 Namely,
there exist a voting cuto (denoted by b l 2 [0;1]) and a proposal cuto (denoted by b e 2 [0;1])
with the following properties. Legislators of type ai > b l accept spending hikes (and refuse
spending cuts), while those with ai  b l accept spending cuts (and refuse spending hikes).
Executives of type ai  b e propose low spending and those of type ai > b e propose high
spending. Given Assumption 1 and recalling that executives are drawn from the legislature,
proposal and acceptance probabilities are simple to compute. Specically, b l is the probability
that a spending cut is approved, while 1 b l is the probability that a spending increase passes.
Conversely, b e ( 1-b e) is the probability that a spending cut ( spending increase) is proposed.
A feature of our setting that keeps things tractable is that in equilibrium both cutos b e
and b l will not depend on the status quo.18
Equilibrium spending levels follow a Markov chain. The probability that, given an initial
status quo i, the legislature approves spending j is denoted by pij. In a cuto MPE, the
transition probability matrix is:
P =
"
pss pss
pss pss
#
=
"
b e + (1   b e)b l (1   b e)(1  b l)
b l b e b e(1  b l) + 1   b e
#
(10)
It is instructive to compute, for instance, the probability that a low status quo is maintained.
The rst term of pss is the probability that a scally responsible agenda setter is recognized
and, consequently, proposes s. Since the status quo is also s, low spending is maintained for
sure in this case. The second term is the probability that a scally irresponsible legislator
becomes agenda setter multiplied by the probability that her proposal to increase spending
is rejected.
A key feature of P is that pss  pss and pss  pss: going to the next period with a low
status quo increases the probability that s will be implemented and reduces the probability
17This is because continuation payos in (7) and (9) do not depend on the legislators' type and because
the spending bias is increasing in ai.
18To see that voting strategies do not depend on the status quo, note from (7) that legislators who accept
a spending increase when the status quo is s are the same who also reject a spending cut when the status
quo is s. Since voting strategies do not depend on q, the executive also does not condition her proposal on q.Spending-Biased Legislators 14
that s will be implemented, respectively. This is what gives legislators the incentive to keep
spending low in the current period.
From (7) we obtain that legislator of type ai accepts a spending cut (and rejects a spending
increase) if
ai (s   s)  [EV (s)   EV (s)]: (11)
Expression (11) has a simple interpretation: legislator ai is scally responsible if the current
gain from spending is smaller than the net gain of going to the next period with a low status
quo spending level.
The expected continuation utilities of going to the next period with status quos s and s,
respectively, are:
EV (s) = pss[ s   EV (s)] + (1   pss)[ s   EV (s)]: (12)
EV (s) = pss[ s   EV (s)] + (1   pss)[ s   EV (s)]: (13)
Using (12) and (13), condition (11) can be rewritten as
ai (s   s)  (pss   pss)(s   s) + 
2(pss   pss)[EV (s)   EV (s)]: (14)
After repeatedly substituting (12) and (13) into the above trade-o condition, we obtain
ai (s   s)  (s   s)(pss   pss)
P1
t=0 
t(pss   pss)
t: (15)
From (10) we obtain that
pss   pss = (1  b l)b e +b l(1   b e); (16)
where b l and b e denote the voting and proposal cutos that ai expects future legislators will
follow. The expression (1   b l)b e + b l(1   b e) has an interesting interpretation: it relates to
the probabilities of political deadlock due to disagreement between the legislature and the
executive. In fact, (1 b l)b e is the probability that a spending increase is proposed and rejected,
while b l(1   b e) is the probability that a spending cut is proposed and rejected. Using (16)Spending-Biased Legislators 15
condition (15) can be rewritten as:
ai  
(1  b l)b e +b l(1   b e)
1   [(1  b l)b e +b l(1   b e)]
: (17)
Note that the right-hand side of (17) is strictly positive only if policymakers disagree
and a status quo bias is expected. When there is disagreement, current spending is more
likely to be maintained in the future. This makes condition (17) more likely to be satised.
Conversely, the right-hand side of (17) is equal to zero when unanimous decisions are expected
to occur. This occurs under two circumstances: when b l and b e are both equal to 0 (all future
legislators are scally irresponsible) and when both are equal to 1 (all future legislators are
scally responsible). In the former case, the net gain of choosing low spending is zero because
approving s cannot prevent future politicians from unanimously choosing high spending. In
the latter case, all future politicians are expected to accept and propose low spending. Since
high spending will be cut for sure in the future, it is not costly to choose s in the current
period. In other words, current legislators have an incentive to free-ride on future legislators'
responsibility.
We emphasize that the endogeneity of the status quo is also key to provide incentives to
be scally responsible. If the bargaining default option was exogenously xed, there would
be no dynamic link across periods and the right-hand side of (17) would be equal to zero.
Notice that (7) coincides with condition (9). Thus, the trade-o faced by the agenda setter
is identical to the trade-o of a voting legislator: an agenda setter of type ai proposes low
spending if (17) holds. Consequently, in equilibrium the voting and proposal cutos coincide.
Setting b e = b l in (17), the equilibrium cuto(s) can be found by solving
b l = 
2(1  b l)b l
1   2(1  b l)b l
: (18)Spending-Biased Legislators 16
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Figures 1-2 illustrate the cuto rule used by current policy makers (on the vertical axis) as
a function of the expected cuto used by future policy-makers (on the horizontal axis). Figure
1 and Figure 2 show the cases when   1=2 and  > 1=2, respectively. The plotted curve,
which coincides with the right-hand side of (18), is hump-shaped. As previously discussed, it
is zero when b l = 0. When all future policy makers are expected to be scally irresponsible,
there is no incentive to choose low spending in the current period. As more policy-makers
are expected to be scally responsible, the gain from choosing low spending increases. That
is, future and current scal responsibility are strategic complements. The curve reaches its
maximum value at 1/2. This is because when b l = 1=2 disagreement is at its peak in the
legislature and, consequently, the status quo is most likely to persist. However, the curve's
slope eventually becomes negative. When most future policy makers are expected to be
responsible, it is less costly to go to the next period with a high status quo policy. Future
and current scal responsibility eventually become strategic substitutes.
Since cutos do not depend on the state, current and future cutos must coincide in
equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium cuto corresponds to the intersection with the 45 degree
line. When  is low, strategic complementarities are weak, generating a unique equilibrium:
b l = b e = 0. In this case, being irresponsible is a self-fullling equilibrium: all legislators, even
those with an innitesimally small spending bias, nd it protable to propose and accept
high spending. When instead  is greater than 1=2 we obtain two equilibria, denoted by A
and B in Figure 2. In equilibrium B no legislator is expected to vote or propose low spending.Spending-Biased Legislators 17
In A low spending is proposed and accepted with positive probability.
The above results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
For any  2 [0;1] there exists a MPE where all players use the cutos b e = b l = 0 and where
s is implemented with probability one at all times.
For any  > (1=2;1] there also exists an interior equilibrium, with cuto
b e
 = b l
 =
p
2   1
p
2
(19)
where s is implemented with strictly positive probability.
Figure 3
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For any given MPE, we can compute the corresponding transition matrix and derive the
stationary distribution i, i 2 fs;sg, such that i2fs;sg ipij = j for all j 2 fs;sg. The
unconditional probability of observing high spending is
s =
pss
pss + pss
(20)
Using (10), (20) and the results of Proposition 1, in Figure 3 we show how s varies with .
In case of multiple equilibria, we pick the best-case scenario: that is, the lowest equilibriumSpending-Biased Legislators 18
probability corresponding to each .19 Thus,
s =
8
> <
> :

1 
p
2 1 p
2
2

1 
p
2 1 p
2
2
+
2 1
2
 > 1=2
1   1=2
(21)
Recalling that  can be thought as a proxy of institutional quality, Figure 3 indicates
that improving institutions has no consequence on economic outcomes in economies where
institutions are initially very weak, but it has a larger eect when the quality of institutions
is above the 1/2 threshold. Moreover, the model exhibits a sort of \diminishing returns"
property: the marginal eect of higher  gets small in absolute value as  increases.
An increase in  lowers s through two channels. First, it makes politicians more forward-
looking: taking as given the strategies of all other players, this rst eect increases the
incentive to be scally responsible and reduces s. Second, it changes other legislators'
behavior which has an ambiguous eect on the incentives to spend. Figures 4 and 5 illustrate
the eects on legislators' behavior. In Figure 4, we increase  from 0:55 to 0:65. Note that
when taking the action of the other legislators as given, the rst channel moves the cuto from
C to C0. However, the equilibrium response exceeds the partial response: C00 is greater than
C0. To understand why the second channel amplies the rst one, note that in the interior
cuto when  = 0:55, the majority of legislators are in favor of high spending. Increasing
 induces more scal responsibility, thus increasing disagreement among legislators. This
leads to more status-quo bias and consequently stronger incentives to keep spending low, i.e.,
current and future scal responsibility are complements at low levels of . The existence of
a \responsibility multiplier" triggered by higher levels of  explains why the unconditional
probability of s being accepted drops fast after 1=2.
In Figure 5, we show an increase in  from 0:8 to 0:9. At higher levels of , the rst
and second channels go in opposite directions. To see this, notice that the partial response
taking the action of others as given (from D to D0) exceeds the equilibrium response. The
reason is that in the interior cuto when  = 0:8 the majority of legislators are in favor of low
spending. When  increases, even more politicians become scal responsible: disagreement
19Analyzing the worst-case scenario (i.e., the equilibrium where all legislators are irresponsible) would not
be interesting since it is not aected by changes of parameters and/or institutions.Spending-Biased Legislators 19
among legislators is reduced as a result. This second channel weakens the incentives to keep
spending low. At high levels of , current and future scal responsibility are then strategic
substitutes.20 Figure 5 illustrates that the second channel is never strong enough to oset
the rst one. However, when  is large, the second channel partly attenuates the eect of
higher  on s.
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4. Distributional Shift: Extending the Voting Franchise
In this section we consider the following experiment: we change Assumption 1 and introduce
a positive mass of legislators with a strong (ai = 1) spending bias.21
It is often argued (see Rogo, 1985 and Persson and Tabellini, 1994) that voters have an
incentive to elect candidates with less credibility problems than themselves. Interestingly, our
results indicate that under some circumstances, voters may instead nd it protable to elect
legislators with a stronger spending bias. As shown below, inecient spending may decrease
as a result.
20It can be shown that the level at which substitutability starts to operate is 2/3.
21The alternative experiment (the introduction of a positive mass of legislators with no spending bias)
would give symmetric results and is therefore omitted.Spending-Biased Legislators 20
Formally, we let G(ai) denote the cdf representing the distribution in the legislature. We
assume that
G(ai) =
(
(1   )ai if 0  ai < 1;
1 if ai = 1;
(22)
where  2 [0;1]: Legislators are continuously distributed over [0,1) and there is a mass point
at 1, with mass equal to . Note that when  is zero, (22) corresponds to the previously
analyzed case.
Similar to what happens when we lower , increasing  raises the average spending bias
in the legislature. Notice, however, that while  moves the spending bias of all legislators in
a symmetric fashion, increasing  causes a distributional shift and introduces more hetero-
geneity of views in the legislature. As discussed below, this might help to reduce self-control
problems.
We continue to assume that the recognition probability for selecting the executive is
uniform on [0,1]; in spite of being more numerous, legislators with ai = 1 are as likely as all
others to be recognized agenda setter.22 It can be shown that the equilibrium cuto when 
is positive, denoted as usual by b l, now solves the following equation:
b l = 
(1  b l)(1   )b l + (1   (1   )b l)b l
1   [(1  b l)(1   )b l + (1   (1   )b l)b l]
: (23)
Since recognition probabilities are uniformly distributed on [0,1], the probability of observ-
ing a scally responsible executive is still b l. Conversely, the measure of legislators accepting
a spending cut is now b l(1   ). In light of this, the transition matrix becomes:
P=
2
4
(1   )(1 b l)b l+b l

 + (1   )(1  b l)

(1 b l)
(b l)
2(1   )

 + (1   )(1 b l)

b l + (1 b l)
3
5 (24)
Note that increasing  aects transition probabilities in (24) through two channels. First,
there is a direct eect via . Since more legislators have a strong spending bias, spending cuts
will be more likely to be rejected and spending increases will be more likely to be accepted.
This undoubtedly increases the probability of observing high spending.
22For instance, in presidential systems the executive does not necessarily reect the balance of power in
the legislature.Spending-Biased Legislators 21
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Second, increasing  aects the transition matrix by changing equilibrium behavior. In
Figures 6 and 7 we increase  from 0 to 0.4 and show that b l may move in both directions.
Specically, we obtain that when  is relatively high (see Figure 7, where we assume  = 0:8),
the interior cuto is higher. In this case, having more legislators who are scally irresponsible
disciplines some of the legislators who were scally irresponsible when  was zero. This
disciplinary eect arises because strategic substitutability is at work. The intuition for this
result is similar to the one discussed at the end of Section 3. When  is suciently high and
 = 0, the equilibrium cuto is above 1/2 and thus the majority of legislators are scally
responsible. After adding legislators with a strong bias, the legislature will be more evenly
split between responsible and irresponsible. This increases future disagreement and (pss pss),
and thus provides stronger incentives to propose and accept low spending. Conversely, when 
is relatively low (see Figure 6, where we assume  = 0:6), strategic complementarity operates.
Adding more legislators who are scally irresponsible triggers even more irresponsibility: the
interior cuto moves down. The intuition for this result is that when  is suciently low,
most legislators are scally irresponsible. Having more legislators with a strong bias further
reduces the likelihood of disagreement since there is now quasi-unanimity in favor of high
spending. This makes low spending levels less persistent and thus provides weaker incentives
to propose and accept low spending.
Knowing (24), we can compute the stationary probability of observing high spending and
analyze how it varies with . The total eect on s is given by the sum of the direct and
equilibrium channels. When  is small both channels predict that a higher  increases spend-Spending-Biased Legislators 22
ing. As shown in Figure 8, in economies where  is small, it is not desirable to add legislators
with a strong-spending bias since this aggravates self-control problems and considerably in-
creases spending. However, when  is high the two channels have opposite implications on
s. Remarkably, this implies that in economies with high , a signicant increase of  has
little eect on s. When  is close to 1, it may actually reduce spending. We obtain this
surprising result when the disciplinary eect overcomes the direct eect.
As mentioned in the Introduction, an increase of  could arise from an extension of the
voting franchise which gives the right to vote to poor (hence, pro-spending) citizens. The
recent literature has provided several theories to explain why a powerful elite is willing to
dilute power. According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), the extension of the franchise
and the associated increase in redistribution are the rational response by the elite to the
threat of revolution.23 Our model provides an additional explanation. Namely, we argue
that extending the franchise serves a disciplinary role. In some cases, the elite attenuates
self-control problems and achieves a spending reduction by adding pro-spending politicians to
the legislature.24 Figure 8 illustrates that this is more likely to occur when  is high. Recalling
that  relates to the degree of foresightedness by legislators but also, more generally, to the
overall quality of institutions, this suggests that a franchise extension is less detrimental to
the elite when the economy has attained a suciently high level of institutional quality.
A prediction of the theory is that extending the voting franchise does not always lead to
higher spending. Indeed, the empirical evidence relating size of government and expansion
of voting rights does not reach clear-cut results. On the one hand, Husted and Kenny (1997)
look at the US and they support the view that national franchise reforms help increase the size
of government. On the other hand, Aidt et al (2008) look at municipal boroughs in England
and Wales at the end of the 19th century and nd that in some cases the voting franchise
is a source of retrenchment rather than of expansion of public spending. Aidt et al (2006)
consider Western European countries and nd that the extension of the voting franchise to
men increased spending mainly on defense, internal security, roads, and transportation. In
23For a dierent theory, see Lizzeri and Persico (2004).
24It bears mentioning that an extension of the franchise would not reduce spending if the elite transfers all
power to legislators representing poor constituencies. This is rarely the case. In the UK, for instance, the
House of Lords kept substantial veto power. The Parliamentary act 1911 was the rst attempt to limit the
legislation-blocking powers of the House of Lords (the suspensory veto).Spending-Biased Legislators 23
some cases, they show that spending in collective goods and transfers actually went down.25
Mulligan et al. (2003) and Profeta et al. (2012) also nd that democracies do not necessarily
spend more.
Figure 8
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5. Other Implications
In this section we modify the benchmark model of Section 3 along two dimensions. First, we
drop the assumption that recognition probabilities are i.i.d. over time. Second, we change
the rule specifying the number of votes necessary to pass a proposal. We consider whether
the results are robust to these assumptions and study the consequences of such changes on
spending.
25They also show that the female surage had little or, if anything, a negative impact on government
spending.Spending-Biased Legislators 24
5.1. Reducing Political Turnover:  = 1
In this section, we increase the durability of the executive by increasing .26 We modify
Assumption 2 and consider the opposite benchmark:  = 1.27 In this case, the agenda setter
is never changed. However, there is still a separation of power: the xed executive needs the
approval of the legislature to change policy.
Proposition 2 below states that the type of the xed agenda setter (her idiosyncratic
parameter as) determines equilibrium long-run spending. If the xed agenda setter's type is
below threshold , dened in (25), there exists a MPE in which the executive proposes s in
all periods. As soon as this proposal is accepted, the economy reaches an absorbing state
with low spending.28 If instead the xed agenda setter has a spending bias above threshold
the economy ends up in an absorbing state with high spending, in all MPE of the political
game.
Proposition 2: Suppose that Assumptions 1 holds and that  = 1. Let as denote the type
of the xed agenda setter and  2 (0;1] be given.
(i) If as > , where
 
1
2
(
q
4
2 + 1   1); (25)
in all MPE we have that as proposes s in all periods. Regardless of the initial status quo, the
economy reaches an absorbing state of high spending.
(ii) If as  , there exists a MPE in which as proposes s in all periods. In this equilibrium,
regardless of the initial status quo, the economy reaches an absorbing state of low spending.
Proof: See Appendix A2.
When  = 1 we compute the unconditional probability of  s as follows. In case of multiple
equilibria, as before we pick the lowest equilibrium probability corresponding to each . It
26In practice,  depends on various constitutional provisions (for instance, term length and limits) and
other factors (e.g., fund-raising advantages and franking privilege) aecting the strength of the executive's
incumbency advantage.  also depends on voters' electoral decisions, which are not modeled here. In future
research, it would be desirable (but dicult) to model the electoral stage.
27Solving the intermediate cases  2 (0;1) is considerably more intricate. Details can be provided upon
request.
28In this parameter range there is also a \bad" equilibrium where all legislators accept and propose high-
spending. In Appendix A2 we give a detailed characterization of all MPE of the game with a xed agenda
setter.Spending-Biased Legislators 25
is immediate that when  = 1, s is simply the probability that the xed executive has
type above the cuto . Knowing that the xed agenda setter is drawn from a uniform
distribution on [0;1], s is equal to 1   (
p
4
2 + 1   1)=(2), which is strictly decreasing in
. Depending on , the executive may or may not choose more scally responsible decisions
when she expects to remain in power in the next periods.
Figure 9
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Figure 9 illustrates that increasing turnover is welfare improving (spending is lower) when
 is suciently large, while if  is suciently small no turnover is instead preferable. To
understand why, suppose that  < 1=2 and consider an agenda setter with a small preference
parameter (below cuto ). With no turnover we know from Proposition 2 that there exists
a MPE in which this agenda setter makes scally responsible decisions. Conversely, given
that  < 1=2, Proposition 1 establishes that in all MPE the same agenda setter would choose
high spending when she expects to be replaced.
What is the intuition behind this result? It is key to understand that in this model varying
 aects outcomes by changing expectations about the next executive's spending-bias. Due
to strategic interdependence, this signicantly alters current incentives. When recognition
probabilities are i.i.d., the current agenda setter expects to be followed by an agenda setter
who is randomly drawn from the legislators' distribution (hence, a legislator with the meanSpending-Biased Legislators 26
parameter ai, equal to 0.5). If  is low, this implies that future agenda setters are expected to
have a strong incentive to propose high spending. The current agenda setter foresees future
agreement in favor of high spending and, recalling that strategic complementarities operate
when  is low, she is discouraged from being responsible. This occurs even if the current
executive has an innitesimally small spending-bias.
When instead  = 1, an agenda setter with a small spending bias expects to be \replaced"
by an agenda setter with similarly low ai. This, coupled with the threat of an irresponsible
legislature, raises the extent of future disagreement and thus gives the current executive
stronger incentives to keep spending low. To summarize, when  < 1=2 and there is maximum
executive turnover, all agenda setters with ai 2 [0;1] are discouraged from choosing low
spending. When  < 1=2 and executives are durable, there is at least a positive measure of
executives, equal to , who make scally responsible decisions. Since  is strictly positive
for any , this explains why no executive turnover is ex ante more desirable than maximum
turnover for suciently small .
When  is larger than 1=2, s with political turnover drops rapidly due to the responsi-
bility multiplier discussed in the previous sections. With a xed agenda setter such strategic
complementarities do not arise and the probability of high spending decreases more slowly.
After a certain threshold, which is equal to 2=3, we have that s with political turnover falls
below the value of s that we obtain when the agenda setter is xed over time.
A common view in the political economy literature (see Section 2) is that high political
turnover leads to inecient outcomes because it reduces the eective \discount factor" of
the current government, leading to myopic behavior. In this section we have shown that
in economies with suciently high institutional quality this prediction fails to hold, and
therefore high political turnover actually improves eciency.
5.2. Constraints on the Executive
Let x 2 [0;1] be the measure of legislators in favor of the executive's proposal. So far we have
assumed that the probability of acceptance was x. We now suppose that the probability of
acceptance is g(x), where
g(x) =
(1   )x
(1   x)
;  < 1 (26)Spending-Biased Legislators 27
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Notice that g([0;1]) 2 [0;1], g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1 for all  2 ( 1;1) and g0(x) > 0 for all x
and all  2 ( 1;1). Moreover, g is strictly convex when 0 <  < 1 and it is strictly concave
when  < 0 (see Figure 10). The case analyzed so far corresponds to  = 0. When  > 0 we
have g(x) < x. Compared to the  = 0 case, the executive faces more constraints and nds it
more dicult to pass a proposal. If  < 0 we have g(x) > x, it is easier for the executive to
pass her proposal. In actual democracies, an increase of  can be obtained by increasing the
number of veto players and by tightening the majority requirement that is needed to pass
legislation. Therefore, we can think of  as a measure of the degree of separation of power
between the executive and the legislative.
Given the equilibrium cutos b l and b e, proposal and acceptance probabilities are simple to
compute. For instance, g(b l) is probability that a spending cut is accepted when it is proposed,
while 1   g(1  b l) is the probability that a spending increase is rejected when it is proposed.
With the more general acceptance probability, after setting b l = b e, trade-o (17) now reads:
ai  
(1  b l)(1   g(1  b l)) +b l(1   g(b l))
1   [(1  b l)(1   g(1  b l)) +b l(1   g(b l))]
(27)
After substituting (26) into (27), it is straightforward to verify that the right hand side
of (27) is increasing in . In other words, increasing  raises the political cost of being
irresponsible. The intuition is straightforward: higher  induces a higher status quo bias,
thereby giving more incentives to choose low spending in the current period to constrainSpending-Biased Legislators 28
future legislatures via the status quo. In Figure 11 we show that similarly to an increase of
, a higher  moves the positive cuto to the right.29
It is instructive to consider what happens as  goes to  1. In the limit, the model
approximates a setting in which policy dictators alternate in power. Absent separation of
power, the status quo does inuence policy decisions. This explains why the right hand side
of (27) goes to zero as  goes to  1. Low spending is never accepted or proposed since
legislators cannot choose low spending in order to constrain future executives. This also
explains why it is not possible to sustain equilibria with low spending when there is a single,
omnipotent, decision-maker.
Consider a country where high spending is often chosen. Does our analysis imply that this
country should adopt a constitution with a high number of constraints on the executive? The
answer is not straightforward. On the one hand, we have shown in Figure 11 that a higher
 raises the measure of scally responsible legislators. On the other hand, since a higher 
implies that more armative votes are need to change the status quo, more constraints on
the executive may make it more dicult to exit a bad status quo level. In Figure 12 we
compute the continuation value function conditional on having a given status quo policy for
given parameter values and show (see the dashed curve) that when the status quo is s the
continuation utility reaches its maximum when  is smaller than one.30 In other terms, there
is a trade-o between providing stronger incentives to be scally responsible and increasing
the probability of exiting a status quo with high spending. Hence, the optimal  is generally
strictly below 1.
29In Figure 11 we set  = 0:7 and raise  from 0 to 1/2.
30In drawing Figure 12 we set  = 0:7, s = 1 and s = 0.Spending-Biased Legislators 29
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5.3. Simple Majority
We now suppose that a proposal passes under simple majority rule: g(x) = 1 if x  1=2 and
zero otherwise. Under simple majority rule, the median is decisive: the executive's proposal
passes if and only if the median legislator, denoted by am, accepts it. Since legislators are
uniformly distributed over the unit interval, am = 0:5. We continue to assume that there is
maximum turnover: in each period an executive is drawn from the uniform distribution and
draws are i.d.d. over time.
Proposition 3: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(i) If   2=3 there exists a MPE in which the median always rejects spending increases and
accepts spending cuts. In this equilibrium, regardless of the initial status quo the economy
reaches an absorbing state of low spending.
(ii) If  < 2=3 in all MPE the median always accepts spending increases and rejects spending
cuts. Regardless of the initial status quo the economy reaches an absorbing state of high
spending.
According to Proposition 3, under simple majority rule spending follows an absorbing
Markov chain. Long-run outcomes are determined by  and are of the bang-bang type. WhenSpending-Biased Legislators 30
 is suciently high, there exists an equilibrium in which the median is scally responsible. If
the initial status quo is s, as soon as low spending is proposed (an event occurring with positive
probability), low spending is accepted by the median and becomes an absorbing state. When
instead  is suciently low, the median is scally irresponsible and the economy eventually
settles into a high spending equilibrium.
Figure 13 compares the long-run probabilities of high spending under simple majority rule
and with probabilistic acceptance. We consider the best case scenario corresponding to each
. As discussed above, simple majority rule leads to low spending when  is above 2/3 and to
high spending otherwise. Note that when  is between 1/2 and 2/3, probabilistic acceptance
provides stronger incentives to keep spending low.31
Figure 13
Simple Majority vs Probabilistic Acceptance
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Even under simple majority rule, legislative bargaining helps reduce self-controls problems.
One dierence with the benchmark model of Section 3 is that, similar to what happens
when the executive is xed, in all MPE under simple majority rule the economy settles into
an absorbing state. The advantage of probabilistic acceptance is therefore to capture the
uncertainty that is associated to the political process. Presumingly, such uncertainty is one
of the reasons explaining why public policies uctuate over time instead of settling in an
absorbing state.
31Consistently, but in a very dierent setting, Nosal and Ordo~ nez (2013) show that uncertainty can improve
eciency by acting as a commitment device.Spending-Biased Legislators 31
6. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the literature that studies the interaction between institutions
and scal outcomes. We consider a legislature where politicians have self-control problems:
they are tempted to increase spending and procrastinate spending cuts. We nd that when
policies are decided through legislative bargaining, disagreement among legislators induces
policy persistence and that this reduces politicians' temptation to raise current spending.
A general lesson of this paper is that institutions matter, but that their eects are het-
erogenous and depend crucially on parameters. We nd that economies where on average
politicians have severe self-control problems (e.g., economies with weak institutions and few
constraints on politicians) may nd themselves trapped in an equilibrium with high spending.
To improve outcomes, it would be desirable to introduce institutional changes that induce
some degree of scal responsibility. Due to strategic complementarity, such changes would
trigger even more responsibility in other legislators and generate a virtuous cycle, leading
to substantial cuts in inecient spending. Conversely, in economies with stronger institu-
tions, strategic substitutability is at work: institutional changes that induce some legislators
to be scally responsible would trigger irresponsibility in other legislators. Surprisingly, we
nd that in such economies institutions which give considerable power to legislators with a
strong temptation to spend put more discipline in the remaining legislators and may reduce
government's size.Spending-Biased Legislators 32
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Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 follows in a straightforward manner from the discussion in the main text. To further help
intuition, we provide below a dierent proof. First, we compute EV (s), the continuation value function.
We use the index B (resp. A) to denote that the realized agenda setter is below (resp. above) the cuto
b e. Further, we let b V j() denote the continuation-value function (that is the value function from tomorrow
onwards) when tomorrow's state is j = A;B and the next period's status quo is s. In computing EV (s) we
assume that future legislators are expected to use the cuto voting strategies b l and b e. Then,
EV (s) = b e b V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s); (A.1)
EV (s) = b e b V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s); (A.2)
where
b V B(s) = b l
n
 s + 
h
b e b V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s)
io
+
(1  b l)
n
 s + 
h
b e b V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s)
io
; (A.3)
b V A(s) =  s + 
h
b eb V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s)
i
; (A.4)
b V B(s) =  s + 
h
b eb V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s)
i
; (A.5)
and
b V A(s) = b l
n
 s + 
h
b e b V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s)
io
+
(1  b l)
n
 s + 
h
b e b V B(s) + (1   b e)b V A(s)
io
: (A.6)
To understand expression (A.3) recall that when tomorrow's agenda setter is below the cuto, s is
proposed. In case of acceptance (an event occurring with probability b l), tomorrow's payo is given by  s and
s becomes the default option in two periods from now. With probability 1 b l the proposal s does not pass and
the status quo s is kept. To understand (A.4), notice that when tomorrow's status quo is s and the realized
agenda setter is above b e, the agenda setter is expected to propose the status quo, which is implemented with
probability one. Along similar lines, we obtained (A.5) and (A.6). After simple algebra, using expressions
(A.1) to (A.6), it is easy to show that ai (s   s)  [EV (s)   EV (s)] coincides with (17).
Using b e = b l, we obtain (18). One easily obtains that the roots of (18) are given by zero and expression
(19), as stated by Proposition 1.Spending-Biased Legislators 38
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition A1 below reformulates Proposition 2 by listing all Markov-perfect equilibria of the dynamic game
with a xed executive.
Proposition A.1: Suppose that Assumptions 1 holds and that  = 1. We let as denote the type of the xed
agenda setter and let b l denote the voting cuto.
(i) For any  and as 2 [0;1] there exists a MPE in which as proposes s at all t and b l = 0.
(ii) If as  , where
 
1
2
(
q
4
2 + 1   1); (A.7)
there exists a MPE in which as proposes s at all t and b l = .
(iii) If as >  and   2=3 there exists a MPE in which as proposes s at all t and
b l =
1   

: (A.8)
We now prove each point of the previous proposition. Note that each legislator at any point in time is
modeled as a separate agent who chooses her current strategy in order to maximize current preferences given
the strategies of all other players (including her future selves). In order to check that a strategy prole is a
Markov Perfect equilibrium, we verify that there are no protable one-shot deviations for executives and for
voting legislators.
Step 1: We prove statement (i) of Proposition A1. First, we verify that for all legislators voting for
high spending is an equilibrium strategy. According to the MPE of point (i) the agenda setter is expected
to propose high spending and all future legislators are expected to favor high spending. After setting b e = 0
and b l = 0 in (17), it is immediate that all legislators with ai  0 have no incentive to deviate and accept low
spending. Second, it is possible to show that the xed agenda setter does not have any incentive to propose
low spending if she expects all future players to favor high spending. We have therefore shown that there are
no protable deviations from the strategy prole described in point (i).
Step 2: We prove statement (ii) of Proposition A1. First, we show that voting legislators have no
protable deviation. Since the agenda setter is expected to propose low spending at all t and b l = , we set
b e = 1 and b l =  in (17). Then, a legislator of type ai strictly prefers voting for low spending if
ai

<
1   
1   (1    )
(A.9)
and strictly prefers high spending if
ai

>
1   
1   (1    )
: (A.10)
Note that  solves
x

=
1   x
1   (1   x )
: (A.11)Spending-Biased Legislators 39
After noticing that the right hand side of (A.11) is decreasing, while the left hand side of (A.11) is increasing
in x, we conclude that voting legislators with ai   have no incentive to deviate and vote for high spending
and those with ai >  also have no incentive to deviate and vote for low spending.
Finally, we need to show that when future legislators are expected to vote using a cuto rule given by
, the xed agenda setter has no incentive to deviate in the current period and propose high spending. It
is immediate that if the xed agenda setter has as  , (A.9) holds. Then, a one-shot deviation consisting
in proposing high spending is not protable. Finally, given the strategy prole of point (ii), it is immediate
that low spending, once approved, it is an absorbing state.
Step 3: We prove statement (iii). First, we show that an agenda setter with as >  has no incentive
to propose low spending if the measure of scally responsible legislators is  = (1   )=. That is, we need
to check that
as

>
1   
1   (1    )
: (A.12)
or, after substituting  into (A.12),
as >
2   1
2(1   )
: (A.13)
A sucient condition for (A.13) to be satised when as   is   2=3. To conclude the proof of point (ii)
we need to show that voting legislators have no incentives to deviate. After setting b e = 0 and b l =  in (17),
rst we need to check that a legislator of type ai   has no incentive to vote for high spending:
ai

<

1   
(A.14)
Second, we need to check that a legislator of type ai >  has no incentive to vote for low spending: that is,
ai

>

1   
(A.15)
Equation
x

=
x
1   x
(A.16)
has two roots: a strictly positive root,
x1 =
1   

; (A.17)
and
x2 = 0: (A.18)
After substituting x1 into (A.15) and (A.14), it is immediate to verify our two claims. Given the strategy
prole of point (ii), it is immediate that high spending, once approved, it is an absorbing state.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
We reformulate Proposition 3 by listing all Markov-perfect equilibria of the dynamic game under simple
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Proposition A.2: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We let am denote the median in the legislature,
let  be given by expression (A.7) and we let b e denote the measure of scally responsible executives.
(i) For any  2 [0;1] there exists a MPE in which am accepts s and rejects s at all t and b e = 0.
(i) If   2=3 there exists a MPE in which the median always rejects s and accepts s, and b e = .
(i) If   2=3 there exists a MPE in which the median always accepts s and rejects s, and b e = (1   )=.
Step 1: We prove statement (i). Following Step 1 of the Proof of Proposition 2 it is obvious that none
has incentive to deviate if all legislators are expected to be scally irresponsible in the future.
Step 2: We prove statement (ii).
Since the median is expected to be responsible at all t and b e = , we set b l = 1 and b e =  in (17). If
  2=3 it can be shown that the median (who has type 0.5) is below . In this case, it follows that inequality
0:5

<
1   
1   (1    )
(A.19)
is satised: the median has no incentive to deviate and be scally irresponsible.
It is also immediate that executives have no incentives to deviate. Executives with ai >  satisfy
ai

>
1   
1   (1    );
(A.20)
while executives with ai   satisfy
ai


1   
1   (1    );
(A.21)
Finally, it is easy to show that once s is proposed the economy settles in a low-spending absorbing state.
Step 3: We prove statement (iii). First we show that there are no one-shot protable deviations for
the median. Before showing this, note that if   2=3 the median (who has type 0.5) is above  where  is
equal to (1   )=. In this case, inequality
0:5

>

1   
(A.22)
is satised. This proves that the median has no incentive to deviate and be scally irresponsible. Second, it
is immediate that executives have no incentives to deviate. Executives with ai >  satisfy
ai

>

1   ;
(A.23)
while executives with ai   satisfy
ai



1   :
(A.24)
It is immediate that given the strategy prole of point (iii), once s is proposed the economy settles in a
high-spending absorbing state.